The memorandum keeps to the parameters of talks about talks, focusing on the government’s reasons for refusing to meet the ANC. The ‘Mandela document’, described as the 1989 memorandum to PW Botha became known, is the most unambiguous indication of what Mandela set out to achieve when he began to engage with the regime.
Quote two articles
The ‘Mandela document’, described as the 1989 memorandum to PW Botha became known, is the most unambiguous indication of what Mandela set out to achieve when he began to engage with the regime. It adheres to the explanation he gave to a concerned Oliver Tambo when the latter smuggled a message into jail asking him what he was up to behind those prison walls. (‘A meeting between the ANC and the government,’ was Mandela’s curt response.)
The memo keeps to the parameters of talks about talks, focusing on the government’s reasons for refusing to meet the ANC. Mandela robustly challenges the government’s precondition that the ANC renounce violence, and defends the alliance of the ANC and the SACP.
He disabuses the government of its claim that socialism was the ANC’s goal and insists that the Freedom Charter envisaged a mixed economy. Mandela also rejects the government’s condemnation of the principle of majority rule, which he insists is a necessary condition for stability and peace to prevail in SA.
“Majority rule and internal peace,” Mandela argued, “are like the two sides of a single coin, and white South Africa simply has to accept that there will never be peace and stability in this country until the principle is fully applied.” His discussions with Coetsee and the Barnard team had led him to hone his argument and Mandela urged that “the key to the whole situation is a negotiated settlement and a meeting between the government and the ANC will be the first major step towards lasting peace in the country”.
He crisply set out the challenge that negotiations would have to confront:
Two political issues will have to be addressed at such a meeting: firstly, the demand for majority rule in a unitary state, secondly, the concern of white SA over this demand, as well as the insistence of whites on structural guarantees that majority rule will not mean domination of the white minority by blacks.
The most crucial task which will face the government and the ANC will be to reconcile these two positions. Such reconciliation will be achieved only if both parties are willing to compromise. The talks with Coetsee and the team led by Barnard had reached the point where both sides understood the core issues that negotiations should address. By this time, Tambo had secretly briefed Mandela about what later came to be known as the Harare Declaration.
The Harare Declaration, adopted on August 21 1989 by the OAU subcommittee on Southern Africa at its summit in Harare, Zimbabwe, urged the apartheid regime “to take measures to create a climate for negotiations, to put an end to apartheid and define a new constitutional order based on a set of democratic principles (also listed in the declaration). It also elaborated on the conditions for the negotiations to start.” Any hopes that the regime may have entertained of detaching Mandela from the ANC were dashed. The country continued to hurtle towards what many began to see as its Armageddon.
Tambo made sure he had fully canvassed the heads of the Frontline States by the time the ANC NEC met on August 9 1989 to finalise the draft of the Harare Declaration. That evening, he suffered a debilitating stroke which rendered him out of action. He had devoted all his energy to ensuring that the draft would be adopted by the Frontline States, who in turn would sponsor it at the OAU, who in turn would take it to the UN for its imprimatur.
BROEDERBOND – MELLS PARK TALKS
Parallel to these developments, another initiative was unfolding. The Mells Park talks had their origins in a meeting between Tambo and a group of British businesspeople in London in June 1986. Michael Young, the political advisor to Rudolph Agnew, chairman and group CEO of Consolidated Gold Fields, had approached Tambo to ask what a company such as theirs could do. Tambo asked him to “help build a bridge between the ANC and those Afrikaners close to the government as progress was impossible without some form of communication”.
After securing Agnew’s approval, Young approached senior figures in the Afrikaner establishment. They included academics such as Willie Esterhuyse and Sampie Terreblanche. Both appear to have been members of the Broederbond at the time and would therefore have been privy to the June 1986 Broederbond document titled ‘Basic political policy conditions for the survival of the Afrikaner’. There is a correlation between the views advanced in this paper and the line of questions posed by Esterhuyse and Terreblanche at the Mells Park talks.
Esterhuyse was approached by Fleur de Villiers, a consultant for Consolidated Gold Fields, who called him from London to brief him on Young’s proposal. A few weeks later, he received a phone call from Pretoria requesting a meeting. This led to a discussion with Koos Kruger and Möller Dippenaar of the NIS at Esterhuyse’s home in Stellenbosch. Esterhuyse felt that, in light of the Consolidated Gold Fields project, co-operating with the NIS would give him the opportunity to advance a process of peace and democratisation. After that, he received regular, intensive briefings from the NIS in various safe houses, even meeting NIS head Niël Barnard at some stage. In his record of the second bilateral Mells Park meeting held from February 22 to 24 1988, Young states that Esterhuyse “briefed the state president following the October session.
Both the state president and Dr Niel Barnard, director-general of the National Intelligence Agency [sic], had asked Esterhuyse to ensure the continuance of the dialogue.” In a memo dated May 31 1988, Young adds that “since the last round of discussions held at Eastwell Manor from February 13-15 1988 the state president has been fully briefed and is now positively in favour of further discussions.
Another related article :
When President F.W. de Klerk announced the unbanning of the liberation movements on 2 February 1990, he opened the door to negotiations that would end apartheid and pave the way to democracy. But how did this moment come about? What power struggles and secret talks had brought the country to this point? Written by two ANC veterans who were close to these events. Breakthrough sheds new light on the process that led to the formal negotiations.
Focusing on the years before 1990, the book reveals the skirmishes that took place away from the public glare, as the principal adversaries engaged in a battle of positions that carved a pathway to the negotiating table. Drawing from material in the prison files of Nelson Mandela, minutes of the meetings of the ANC Constitutional Committee, the NWC and the NEC, notes about the Mells Park talks led by Professor Willie Esterhuyse and Thabo Mbeki, communications between Oliver Tambo and Operation Vula, the Kobie Coetsee Papers, the Broederbond archives and numerous other sources, the authors have pieced together a definitive account of these historic developments.
While most accounts of South Africa’s transition deal with what happened during the formal negotiations, Breakthrough demonstrates that an account of how the opposing parties reached the negotiating table in the first place is indispensable for an understanding of how South Africa broke free from a spiralling war and began the journey to democracy.
Senior members of the African National Congress held a clandestine meeting on 16 June 1986 at Long Island with the leader of the Afrikaner Broederbond, a secretive South African society that includes most, if not all, of the leaders of the Pretoria Government, according to some who were present.
The meeting was convened by Franklin Thomas, who heads the Ford Foundation, which has long tried to play an active role in trying to foster understanding among the races in South Africa and avert large-scale violence there. Mr. Thomas did not return a reporter’s telephone calls. Meeting Mainly for 2 Groups.
Representatives of other groups were present, but the principal purpose of the meeting, sources said last week, was to bring Professor DeLange together with the African National Congress officials, Thabo Mbeki, Mac Maharaj and Seretse Choadi.
One of the Broederbond’s most important policy documents, “Basic Political Conditions for the Continuing Survival of the Afrikaner”, was circulated among its 20,000 members and released publicly in November 1986. It argued that the exclusion of blacks at the highest level of decision-making was a threat to the survival of whites.
Ironies, dat vanaf Kodesa tot datum, is daar duisende grondeise, geskoei op aparte gebiede, wat of Trust of CPA’s genoem word, met elkeen hul eie onderskeidelike wetgewings en tradisionele leiers. Dit vorm deel van Grondwet en Swart/Khoi San leiers is al oor die 8840 in Parlement wat ons onderhou. Noem as voorbeelde, Ingonyama Trust is slegs vir Zoeloevolk en Richtersveld is vir Khoi San. Daar is steeds rassistiese en diskriminerende wetgewings wat slegs teenoor blankes diskrimineer. Die ou Britse kroongebiede is in 2007 aan Khoi San oorhandig nadat grondeise ingedien is, slegs vir hulle. Waar is die Broederbond aka Afrikanerbond of kerke of selfs oorseese regerings wat dit veroordeel? ‘n Dubbel stelsel word binne die Grondwet gehuisves.
The Afrikaner elite recognized that remaining at an impasse was also dangerous. In mid-1986 the Afrikaner Broederbond, the secret communication channel between the government and the elite, issued a circular to that effect entitled “Political Values for the Survival of the Afrikaner.” It declared that “the greatest risk
that we are taking today is not taking any risks.” The abolition of statutory discrimination had become a “prerequisite for survival” while black exclusion from politics “had become a threat to survival.” Also in 1986, the Dutch Reformed Church, by far the largest of the Afrikaner churches, finally abandoned its support for apartheid as a system that it had long justified theologically.
“Cyril’s eyes lit up.” Roelf Meyer, Francois Venter, the Afrikaner Broederbond and the decision to abandon “group rights” in favour of a “regstaat” (constitutional state)
T. Dunbar Moodie, Hobart and William Smith Colleges, Geneva, NY 14456 & Society, Work and Development Institute (iSWOP), University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg.
In 1982, Afrikanerdom split decisively down the middle. The Broederbond was equally split. Carel Boshoff, the conservative chair of the Broederbond Executive Council (Uitvoerende Raad) was obliged to resign in 1983.
When Francois Venter came forward in 1992 with his proposal for a constitutional state that Roelf Meyer told me turned things around with Cyril Ramaphosa at the most difficult point in the negotiations, he was then only a step or two ahead of the Broederbond consensus.
Daar is heelwat burgers van Suid-Afrika, wat nie bewus was van al bogenoemde en veral geheimsinnige samesprekings tussen sekere liberale en kommunistiese groepe (elites) in die land nie.
Ironies is dit altyd dat daar boeke geskryf word waaruit heelwat geld gemaak word. Indien daar gelees wil word, koop die boeke. Daar is heelwat vrae rondom al hierdie geheimsinnige praatjies.
Waarom word alle inligting soos wetgewing vereis nie onmiddellik beskikbaar gemaak vir almal in die land, veral burgers van die land, ambassadeurs en verteenwoordigers wat soms en meestal anderpad kyk wat in die land aangaan en maak of dit nie bestaan nie.
Heelwat weet baie duidelik wat aan die gang is. Veral die begunstigde Broederbond aka Afrikanerbond en hul sytakke, saam die FW stigting.
Hoekom moet die belastingpligtinge al hierdie geheimsinnige gedagtes in boekvorm opkoop en selfs steeds nie weet of dit 100% korrek is nie.
Let wel – dit het NIKS met die referendum van 1992 te doen gehad nie – dit het toe al reeds gebeur. Ons nageslagte, die jeugdiges weet nog minder wat aangaan as hul aansoek doen vir werk en daar word teen hulle gediskrimineer.
Vandag, na bykans 30-50 jaar, word dit uit ‘n ander oog beskou en duidelik waaroor dit eintlik gegaan het. Die werklikheid en groot redes speel vandag voor ons af.
Hierdie spul wou die kommunistiese nessies veer en behoortlik uitverf vir bevoordeeldes. Die allemintige korrupsie wat wegdreineer en “nuwe wêreld orde” kan nie net ignoreer word nie.
Waarom was daar soveel agteraf samesprekings wat vir etlike jare toegevou is in kommunistiese kombersies?
Die in beheer was eenvoudig bang dat daar nie ‘n oorgangsregering sou plaasgevind het nie. En vandag gaan dit steeds aan as daar na al die korrupsie op hoë vlakke gekyk word. Waarom net eenvoudig NIE vat wat nie aan jou behoort nie – meeste hiervan is belastinginkomstes uit die staatskas uit.
Ons kon al ‘n supermoondheid gewees het as dit nie hiervoor was nie en dit sluit alle korrupsie in, selfs tydens die oorgang en voor 1994. Waarom moet daar ‘n NWO gevoed word?
Die feite in die artikel rakende die Broederbond (aka Afrikanerbond) moet hul eie agenda verklaar, want hierdie organisasie is GEEN Afrikaner of Boer organisasie nie.
Die Broederbond en Afrikanerbond was en is vir etlike jare slegs oop vir sekere blanke MANS en nie vir vroue nie. Reeds so voor 1900. Nie dat vroue die begeertes gehad het vir so iets nie, hul het hul eie organisasies geskep en selfs in 1994 het heelwat by die ANC se vroueliga aangesluit.
Dit bly ‘n swaar klip om ons Boere en Afrikaners se nekke dat hierdie organisasie alewig namens ons, die “Afrikaner” probeer praat en ons aftrek die dieptes in om ons te sink.
Selfs na 1994 is en word die AB altyd met ope arms deur die Parlement ontvang en dan praat hul selfs daar en op hul eie webtuiste namens die Afrikanervolk, terwyl daar geen mandaat voor is nie. Afrikanerbond is multi-kultureel, dus hoe kan hulle vir die Afrikanervolk staan? Dis leuens, hul kan slegs namens hul lede praat en nie die res van ons nie.
Vele kere wat swart en ander persone soos politici beskuldigings maak dat alle Boere en Afrikaners lede is van hulle of selfs Soliforum (Solidariteit, Afriforum en FAK, ens). Daar is slegs ‘n handjievol deel van hulle agendae en hulle is buitendien OOK multi-kultuur. Multi-kultuur organisasies het geen volkskap nie – watter volk is by hulle te bespeur?
Terug by die artikels – in die begin van die “memorandum” voer Mandela aan dit is slegs meerderheidsregering vir “vrede” en niks anders, daar sal andersinds nooit vrede wees nie. En wat gebeur na 1994?
Na bykans 30 jaar na oorname is daar steeds geen vrede nie en die rooi kommunistiese rewolusies volg mekaar op soos dominoes wat val. Nie een is vreedsaam en sonder geweld nie. Al hierdie radikale “vredesoptogte” begin met die afbrand van geboue, besighede, infrastruktuur en ekonomiese vernietiging. Leuens wat uit Mandela se woorde gevloei het, is barbaars en radikale kommunistiese aanslae op die hele land en sy mense. Die woord stabiliteit is nie in die ANC of Mandela se woordeskat te vind nie. Die sing van liedere om blankes uit te wis, aan te val op plase en uit te wis, is groot. Waar is hierdie Afrikanerbond en “regstaat” nou skielik heen?
RELATED INFORMATION – BYKOMENDE INLIGTING
VANDAG is dit nie anders nie.
ABN en Dinokeng
Kodesa leuens – Lies of Codesa
Codesa – Kodesa … failed
Dakar 1986-.. – Notes of H Giliomee
Afrikanerbond : Afrikaner-Broederbond in SA
Mandela (Mells Park House)