Van die begin af was dit gedoem, en de klerk en al sy kollegas wat ons op ‘n skinkbord geoffer het vir volle oorname na 1994, is hoegenaamd nie gepla deur moorde en swart bemagtiging nie. Dit het nie vir de klerk en sy kaders gegaan oor ‘n nuwe “demokratiese grondwet” nie, maar oor hul eie beleid wat vooraf bespreek was (Dakar en ander plekke van geheimhouding). Daar was ook nie internet en sosiale media soos ons vandag het nie. Hoeveel moorde, aanvalle, verkragtings het nie al in die afgelope 30 jaar plaasgevind nie. Hoeveel blankes sit sonder heenkome, woonplek onder bome en geen inkomste weens swart bemagtiging?
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On 20 December 1991, 238 delegates from the 19 participating parties together with nearly 1,000 international observers gathered for the first plenary session, CODESA I. The business and international communities immediately voiced their concern. Over the following weeks there were a number of initiatives to bring in an international mediator.
In mid-July, the UN Security Council held an unprecedented two-day debate on South Africa that resulted in the appointment of a Special-Representative of the Secretary-General, Cyrus Vance, to investigate the violence and make recommendations on restarting talks. This soon led to the creation of a 50-member UN observer mission and support for the National Peace Accord (NPA) structures. The NPA was the only multi-party forum to remain operational throughout this period and provided continuity and a space for party representatives to meet when other avenues for communication were blocked, helping to stabilise the political conflict.
When will the UN held meetings for all the current corruption, rapes, tortures and killings in South Africa? Never?
Although most political groupings participated, the Conservative Party (CP) on the right and AZAPO and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) to the left boycotted it.
Women comprised only about 5 per cent of the delegates. Appalled, parliamentary veteran Helen Suzman intervened to point out the imbalance, highlighting the parallels between gender discrimination and racism. Most of the parties thereafter made efforts to increase gender representivity in the negotiations. The plenary was mostly a ceremonial occasion to mark a formal commitment amongst the participating parties to negotiate a settlement. The delegates agreed a Declaration of Intent to guide the negotiators toward creating a ‘united, non-racial and non-sexist state’ protected by a Bill of Rights, with multi-party democracy based on universal adult franchise and a proportional representation electoral system. They also agreed to form CODESA as a standing institution to facilitate a negotiation process.
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Op 20 Desember 1991 het 238 afgevaardigdes van die 19 deelnemende partye saam met byna 1 000 internasionale waarnemers vir die eerste sitting, CODESA I, vergader. Die sake- en internasionale gemeenskappe het onmiddellik hul kommer uitgespreek. Gedurende die daaropvolgende weke was daar ‘n aantal inisiatiewe om ‘n internasionale bemiddelaar in te stel.
Wat was die regte doel van al die internasionale waarnemers – vandag is almal tjoepstil oor wat in Suid-Afrika aangaan en skuil hul agter die Ambassadeurs en ander kantore in Suid-Afrika.
Die hele Kodesa storie lyk soos ‘n kaal geplukte hoender, want dit was daargestel vir die opstel van ‘n demokratiese grondwet en om almal te akkommodeer. Nie net die ANC en liberales nie.
Ongeveer in die middel van Julie het die VN se Veiligheidsraad ‘n ongekende tweedaagse debat oor Suid-Afrika gevoer wat gelei het tot die aanstelling van ‘n spesiale verteenwoordiger van die sekretaris-generaal, Cyrus Vance, om die geweld te ondersoek en aanbevelings te maak oor die aanvang van gesprekke.
Dit het spoedig gelei tot die skepping van ‘n VN-waarnemersmissie van 50 lede en ondersteuning vir die National Peace Accord (NPA) strukture. Die NVG was die enigste multi-party forum wat gedurende hierdie tydperk operasioneel gebly het en het kontinuïteit en ruimte gebied vir partyverteenwoordigers om bymekaar te kom wanneer ander kommunikasiewaaie geblokkeer is, wat die politieke konflik help stabiliseer het.
Dit is waarnemend dat die Verenigde Nasies nie hul weg oopsien om die baie moorde van die afgelope 27 jaar te ondersoek in Suid-Afrika nie, wie vermoor wie in hierdie land? Hoeveel plaasboere is nie al vermink, gemartel en vermoor nie. En tog wend VN geen poging aan oor al die geweld, misdaad, verkragtings en moorde in die land te ondersoek nie.
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Daar word nie melding gemaak van ander volkere wat ook werksaam was in die besighede nie, omrede daar nie genoeg inligting daaroor is nie. Daar is wel ander volksgroepe wat hierdeur geraak word, soos met die virus ervaar is. Korrupsie is ‘n groot euwel en terwyl die ondersteuners steeds vir die partye stem wat dit veroorsaak, gaan dit nooit verbeter nie.
Selfbeskikking (onafhanklike land en gebiede) gaan ons enigste behoud wees. Nes daar aparte Trust en CPA gebiede is, moet volke nader aan mekaar beweeg en mekaar steun en rugsteun.
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After CODESA’s collapse, De Klerk and Mandela exchanged memoranda and the NP considerably softened its demands. By August 1992, the ANC had agreed to establish a ‘channel bilateral’ for maintaining quiet dialogue, nominating Cyril Ramaphosa to hold talks with the NP’s Roelf Meyer. They made considerable progress and on 26 September Mandela and De Klerk held a summit to sign the Record of Understanding.
They agreed on the principles of an interim government at the national and regional levels empowered by an interim constitution. They also agreed on a formula for an elected assembly that would serve as an interim parliament and draft a constitution based on principles agreed in prior multi-party negotiations. They agreed that to improve efficacy, in future negotiations, the ANC and NP would first reach agreement on a bilateral basis before going to other parties for multilateral negotiation: in sum, others could either agree to be a part of the process or be left behind.
The agreement appalled most right-wing parties – sparking the IFP and CP to join with a number of homeland governments and Afrikaner parties to form the Concerned South Africans Group (COSAG).
They rejected the principles outlined in the agreement and demanded it be scrapped. In the following months, Buthelezi threatened secession but the move was met with intense diplomatic pressure that revealed his isolation.
The agreement also surfaced fault lines within the NP and the ANC over both tactical and substantive principles. The pro-negotiation faction within the NP leadership was eventually able to predominate. The ANC engaged in consultations with constituents and eventually committed itself to a positive-sum negotiating position based on a transitional period of power-sharing, thus decisively moving away from a maximalist, zero-sum strategy aiming at the immediate elimination of the NP as a political force.
ONAFHANKLIK 