Die “migrasie” na ander lande word hier amptelik aangeteken, maar die wat “onwettig” deurgaan word nes in Suid-Afrika nie rekord van gehou nie. By ons, meer as dubbeld as wat ons burgers is in die land – almal soek gratis behuising, medies, dienste, skole, toelaes – ‘n hele maatskaplike kontinent wat gedeeltes hier kom afpak. Mensehandel en ander tipe soos “drugs” is nie hierby uitgesluit nie. Die jongste sensus in Suid-Afrika was 2011 gedoen en dit sluit ook nie immigrante in nie. Miljoene kom plak hier, asook op ander kontinente. George Soros en ander is hoogsbetrokke hierby. Misdaad stap met gemak oor al ons grense …. Interessant dat van hierdie lande bo in Oos-Afrika mure bou dat ander nie hulle lande mag inkom nie.
The majority of migrants on the Gulf of Aden-Yemen/Saudi Arabia route who were interviewed by the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) were Ethiopians and Somalians (Horwood, Forin and Frouws, 2018).
The Saudis and Iranians have never actually declared war on each other. Instead, they fight indirectly by supporting opposing sides in other countries and inciting conflicts. This is known as proxy warfare. And it’s had a devastating effect on the region. Countries, especially poor ones, can’t function if there are larger countries pulling strings within their borders. And that’s exactly what’s happening in the Middle East. The Saudi-Iranian rivalry has become a fight over influence, and the whole region is a battlefield.
The Middle East’s cold war, explained
Environmental problems and economic factors, often aggravated by conflict, have led people to move. A severe drought that ended in 2017 followed by heavy floods in 2018 triggered the internal displacement of 289,000 people in Somalia (IDMC, 2018). 341,000 Somalians were newly displaced due to conflict and violence in the first half of 2018 (ibid.).
As of October 2018, an estimated 551,000 Somalians were refugees in neighbouring countries (UNHCR, 2018). For a period of five years from 2013 , the Government of Ethiopia had banned low-skilled migration to GCC countries which could have also indirectly increased the number of people relying on irregular migration channels (ILO, 2016; 2017).
A combination of environmental factors and intercommunal violence newly displaced 1,562,000 Ethiopians in the first half of 2018 within the country (IDMC, 2018). The factors behind such ongoing movement and displacement in the region, if not resolved, have the potential to trigger further movements across borders in search of livelihood options.
Migrants from the Horn of Africa often make the perilous journey to Yemen in hopes of continuing eastwards and finding asylum or stability in GCC countries. 50,339 new migrant arrivals were observed in the first half of 2018 (ibid.).3 Two important questions are: What is the international community doing to address the specific challenges of this shift? How can data be used to ensure safe and dignified migration in this corridor?
IOM’s Displacement Tracking Matrix uses flow-monitoring points (FMPs) to collect data on movements of populations at entry, transit and exit points. Of the 444,490 migrant observations recorded in Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia and Yemen in the first half of 2018, 45 per cent indicated that they were migrating within the Horn of Africa, 43 per cent on the Eastern route, including Yemen, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, 8 per cent along the southern route and 5 per cent along the northern route (IOM, 2018).
THE U.S. MILITARY has long insisted that it maintains a “light footprint” in Africa, and there have been reports of proposed drawdowns in special operations forces and closures of outposts on the continent, due to a 2017 ambush in Niger and an increasing focus on rivals like China and Russia. But through it all, U.S. Africa Command has fallen short of providing concrete information about its bases on the continent, leaving in question the true scope of the American presence there.
While China, France, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates have increased their own military engagement in Africa in recent years and a number of countries now possess outposts on the continent, none approach the wide-ranging U.S. footprint. China, for example, has just one base in Africa – a facility in Djibouti.
Djibouti is home to the crown jewel of U.S. bases on the continent, Camp Lemonnier, a former French Foreign Legion outpost and AFRICOM’s lone forward operating site on the continent. A longtime hub for counterterrorism operations in Yemen and Somalia and the home of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), Camp Lemonnier hosts around 4,000 U.S. and allied personnel, and, according to Teil, is the “main platform” for U.S. crisis response forces in Africa. Since 2002, the base has expanded from 88 acres to nearly 600 acres and spun off a satellite outpost — a cooperative security location 10 kilometers to the southwest, where drone operations in the country were relocated in 2013. Chabelley Airfield has gone on to serve as an integral base for missions in Somalia and Yemen as well as the drone war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. “United States military personnel remain deployed to Djibouti, including for purposes of posturing for counterterrorism and counter-piracy operations in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, and to provide contingency support for embassy security augmentation in East Africa,” President Donald Trump noted in June.
Only one base lies in the far south of the continent, a CSL in Botswana’s capital, Gaborone, that is run by the Army. To its north, CSL Entebbe in Uganda has long been an important air base for American forces in Africa, serving as a hub for surveillance aircraft. It also proved integral to Operation Oaken Steel, the July 2016 rapid deployment of troops to rescue U.S. personnel after fighting broke out near the American Embassy in Juba, South Sudan.