Is alles net blote spekulasie of is daar geldwassery betrokke? Het munisipaliteite nie belastinginkomstes gebruik om hulself te verryk nie? Hoe ver is Zuma betrokke in die VBS sage – hy was toe nog die president van die land? Ons weet almal, dat berigte al lankal geskryf is en dit bevestig het. Wie is in beheer van die munisipaliteite en wie aanvaar hul jaarverslae? Is dit nie toevallig dat munisipaliteite hul geld in VBS gaan plaas het nie? Artikels dui ook aan Ramaphosa is bewus van al hierdie korrupsie en diefstal? Hy is en was dan deel van Parlement sedert 1994. Dit is ook tyd dat elke minister en selfs regters, wat volgens presidente aangestel word wat met finansies werk ook moes bewus gewees het hiervan, ondersoek word. Wie het die bankrotskappe of plaaslike owerhede se jaarverslae goedgekeur – dis logies, daar is verskeie ministers hierby betrokke. Al ooit gewonder hoekom is daar soveel verskuiwing van ministers?
Is this speculations or is there also money laudering involved? How much are TAX moneys? Did Municipalties use also tax moneys for themselves?
How far is Zuma really involved in the VBS saga – he was the president at that time? We all know that reports and articles have long been written and confirmed. Who is in charge of the municipalities and who accepts their annual reports? Is this a coincidence that municipalities have put their money in VBS to get more from the poorest of the poor? Even the articles also indicate that Ramaphosa is fully aware of all this corruption and theft? He has been and has been part of Parliament since 1994. It is also time that every minister and even judges appointed by presidents who work with finances in this sage, should have been aware of this. Who approved the annual reports of the bankruptcies or local authorities – that’s logical, there are several ministers involved. Ever wondered why the presidents changed the ministers so often in the cabinet? The constitution said he is in charge and he made the rules for him as president.
In March 2018, the Mutual bank VBS has been placed into curatorship, by the Reserve Bank and was run by consultants SizweNtsalubaGobodo on behalf of the Reserve Bank.
And what happened next? Where are all the promises made since then. The SARB [SA Reserve Bank) expressed then that the South African banking system remains safe, sound, and adequately capitalised. (SARB governor Lesetja Kganyago)
Business insider confirmed that VBS had grown very rapidly in recent years – starting when it extended a loan to then President Jacob Zuma. According to SARB numbers, VBS had a balance sheet of R150 million three years ago. The situation during March that it has R2 billion on its balance sheet.
The vast majority of that came from municipalities, which the SARB believes may have had up to R1.5 billion in deposits with VBS at the peak – an influx that suddenly started 18 months ago.
They reported that: 18 months ago is exactly when VBS opened a mortgage for Zuma, which enabled him to repay R7.8 million to the state for taxpayer money spent on his private homestead at Nkandla. But municipal deposits are a bad source for money to lend for mortgages, deputy SARB governor Kuben Naidoo told a press conference in March. “If you take a deposit from a municipality… the relatively maturity is likely to be short,” said Naidoo; typically municipalities want their money back within no more than 12 months, or some 29 years less than a typical home loan.mmm”It is quite a risky strategy to take that money and lend it long term,”.
Municipalities apparently started asking for their money back after the national treasury informed them that making deposits with VBS was illegal – for both the municipalities making the deposits and for the bank that took it, Kganyago said.
Under municipal finance laws, local authorities must keep their money in full-fledged banks, which VBS as a mutual bank was not.
Earlier on City Press reported that VBS learnt six months ago that the treasury was warning municipalities they were breaking the law by keeping their money with VBS.
VBS later applied for a the full banking licence that would allow it to legally accept such deposits. But that application came in only at 8:42AM on 26 February, the Reserve Bank said.
Furthermore – Corruption watch:
MILLIONS LOOTED, DOZENS BENEFITED ILLEGALLY
Motau named 53 people who, he said, had collectively received R1.9-billion from VBS. Among them are a former KPMG partner, Sipho Malaba, who received R34-million; the Venda king, Toni Mphephu Ramabulana, who scored R18-million; Brian Shivambu, the brother of EFF deputy president Floyd Shivambu, who received R16-million, and the big winner – VBS chairperson Tshifhiwa Matodzi, who received R326-million.
“[VBS] is corrupt and rotten to the core. Indeed, there is hardly a person in its employ in any position of authority who is not, in some way or other, complicit,” Motau noted in his recommendations.
He explained that his appointment had a three-fold purpose – to determine whether any of VBS’ business was conducted with the intentions of defrauding customers, whether the bank’s business practices were questionable or reckless, and whether there had been any irregular conduct by shareholders, directors, executive management, staff, stakeholders or others.
The answer to all of those questions, Motau found, would appear to be ‘yes’. “My report will reveal that the perpetrators of the heist at VBS made away with almost R2-billion,” he revealed in the report’s second paragraph – actions inconsistent with VBS Bank’s stated values of “maintaining highest standards of governance, local empowerment and ethics”.
CRIMINAL ACTION RECOMMENDED
The report recommends criminal and civil action – including sequestration and winding-up proceedings – against the beneficiaries of theft. “It is imperative that those who have been identified as participating and benefiting from this criminal enterprise be charged and prosecuted.”
As for the chartered accounts and attorneys who were complicit, Motau said, they are not fit and proper persons to fill those offices, which require utmost honesty and integrity. He recommended that complaints be laid by the SARB’s Prudential Authority with the relevant professional bodies, “so that steps can be taken to strip them of their status”.
While it is impossible to encapsulate the report in a few paragraphs, Business Insider has extracted five significant facts that should anger anyone who despises corruption:
- The average amount ‘gratuitously received from VBS’ was nearly a million per entity per month.
The 53 people and companies named in the report received, over the course of a little more than three years, an average of just about R905 000 each per month. The report carefully lists these as “gratuitous payments” rather than outright bribes or theft, but does so in the context of trying to figure out the scale of the looting at VBS.
- VBS seems to have bought influence from mortal political enemies at the same time.
The “Dudu Myeni Foundation” and Brian Shivambu were both beneficiaries. Motau clarifies that while there is no entity known as the Dudu Myeni Foundation, he assumed that the Jacob G Zuma Foundation – chaired by Myeni – was the organisation in question.
- At least four people have already confessed to huge bribes, or fraud, or both, including the police’s top accountant.
They include: Paul Magula, a former Public Investment Corporation (PIC) executive; Ernest Nesane, a lawyer and PIC executive; Phalaphala Ramikosi, a chartered accountant and the now-suspended CFO of the police service; and Philip Truter, VBS’s CFO.
- A KPMG partner solicited – and got – a fake letter from a bank to cover his tracks.
When KPMG started investigating Malaba’s relationship with the bank “he obtained a fraudulent letter from VBS to put KPMG off the scent”, Motau noted in the report.
Malaba himself, the report says, conceded that the letter that was written at his request “contained various obvious misrepresentations”.
- The actual methods used to allegedly steal money were, at heart, ludicrously simple.
In many cases, Motau says, VBS simply wrote car or home loans, then turned a blind eye when no payments were made on those. Large overdraft facilities also remained unpaid.